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Essay
Kelo Ten Years Later: A City’s Unrealized Dream and
the Destruction of a Neighborhood
HON. PETER T. ZARELLA

In this critique of the essay “Kelo Is Not Dred Scott” written by
Attorneys Wesley Horton and Brendon Levesque, Justice Peter
Zarella explains how the authors of that essay, along with the
Connecticut and United States supreme courts in Kelo v. City of
New London, overlooked an important distinction in cases involving
the taking of private property through eminent domain: public
ownership and control versus private ownership and control. It is
this distinction, Justice Zarella claims, that supports use of
heightened judicial scrutiny in cases where property is taken for the
“public use” of economic development, an approach he advocated
in his dissent in Kelo. He further expounds on how such an
approach was supported by the case law of both Connecticut and the
United States. In addition, this Essay provides a counterpoint to the
argument presented by Attorneys Horton and Levesque that
economic development takings should be treated no different than
other takings by highlighting three ways in which economic
development takings are different than takings previously upheld by
the courts. Finally, Justice Zarella refutes the claim asserted by
Attorneys Horton and Levesque that democracy is an adequate
check on eminent domain abuse.
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Kelo Ten Years Later: A City’s Unrealized Dream
and the Destruction of a Neighborhood
HON. PETER T. ZARELLA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Attorney Horton and Attorney Levesque would have you believe that
Kelo v. City of New London is a story about a distressed municipality in
search of an economic renaissance.1 They open their essay as the City of
New London and New London Development Corporation (NLDC) opened
their brief before the United States Supreme Court: by painting a picture of
a depressed, seaside city poised to turn around its misfortune. For decades,
the city had been plagued by economic decline. It had “an unemployment
rate close to double that of the rest of the state, a shrinking population, a
dearth of new home and business construction” and its largest employer
had just closed.2 Moreover, the city’s principal source of funding was
property taxes, yet fifty-four percent of the property within the city was
tax-exempt.3 Things were about to change for New London, however. It
Associate Justice, Connecticut Supreme Court; J.D., Suffolk University Law School, 1975; B.S.,
Northeastern University, 1972. Justice Zarella was appointed as an Associate Justice of the Connecticut
Supreme Court by Governor John G. Rowland on January 4, 2001. Prior to joining the state’s high
court, he served as an Appellate Court and Superior Court Judge. Before ascending to the bench, he
spent over twenty years in private practice and was a partner in the Hartford law firm of Brown,
Paindiris & Zarella.
The views and opinions expressed in this Essay are those of the author and do not reflect the
position of the Connecticut Supreme Court or the honorable justices thereof. Moreover, this Essay does
not express the views of the justices that constituted the Kelo panel, including those justices who joined
in the dissent.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Attorney Cody Friesz for his diligent research, cogent
comments, and hours of research and drafting that made this Essay possible. In particular, Attorney
Friesz, who currently serves as a law clerk in my chambers, provided great guidance on a topic that has
no boundaries, by constantly reminding me of the specific focus of this Essay—a reply to Attorneys
Horton and Levesque. Attorney Friesz is a member of the Connecticut and Massachusetts bars and
graduated from Suffolk University Law School in 2015. I also wish to express my appreciation to
Attorney Holly Boots who has served in my chambers as my permanent law clerk for over ten years.
Attorney Boots worked diligently on the original dissent in the Kelo matter in 2004 and I wish to take
this much delayed opportunity to thank her for all of her efforts over the years. Attorney Boots is a
member of the Connecticut and New York bars and received her J.D. from Pace Law School. She also
has a Master’s Degree in City and Regional Planning from Harvard University. Lastly, I would like to
thank my Executive Legal Assistant, Elizabeth Hammell, for her editorial support.
1
Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405,
1408 (2016).
2
Id.; see also Brief of the Respondents at 1, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(No. 04-108), 2005 WL 429976, at *1.
3
Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 1.
*
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had recently appointed the NLDC as its development agent, and the NLDC
had crafted a plan that would generate between $680,000 and $1.2 million
in additional tax revenue annually and create over one thousand temporary
and permanent jobs.4 The plan called for the construction of a hotel and
conference center, office space, and upscale housing in the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood.5 All that stood in the way of progress were the private
homes of Susette Kelo and the other Fort Trumbull residents on
development Parcels 3 and 4A.6
In reality, however, this is not just a story about New London. Indeed,
this is also a tale about the courageous battle of Susette Kelo and her
neighbors,7 ordinary people fighting to save their piece of the American
dream—their homes. Ms. Kelo and her fellow neighbors resisted the
condemnation of their homes. When democracy failed to protect them,
they turned to the courts, challenging the decision of the City and the
NLDC to use eminent domain on a number of grounds. This Essay will
address the issue at the heart of Ms. Kelo’s challenge:8 namely, whether
her home and her neighbors’ homes were taken for a “public use.” As the
case moved through the court system, Ms. Kelo’s public use argument
4
Id. at 1–2, 8. The development plan, according to the NLDC, was expected to create 518 to 867
constructions jobs, 718 to 1,362 direct jobs, and 500 to 940 indirect jobs. Id. at 8.
5
Id. at 6–7.
6
The entire Fort Trumbull development area was approximately ninety acres, divided into seven
parcels. Parcels 3 and 4A made up 9.4 acres of the development property, and the properties of Susette
Kelo and her neighbors covered 1.54 acres. Brief of Petitioners at 3–6, Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811059, at *3–6.
7
Nine individuals, owning fifteen properties, challenged the decision to use eminent domain. See
Complaint at 1–2, Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
13, 2002) (No. 01CV0557299S), 2000 WL 35542907. Susette had moved into the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood in July 1997, about a year and one half before the City and the NLDC approved the Fort
Trumbull development plan. Id. at 6, 12. Although she had not lived in the neighborhood long, she
finally had what she always wanted: a place of her own with a view of the water. When she purchased
the home it was overgrown and had been vacant for years. Shortly after moving in, however, she had
restored her Victorian home. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 6, at 2.
Unlike Susette, a number of the other plaintiffs in Kelo had resided in the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood most of their lives. In fact, Wilhelmina Dery, who was in her mid-80s when Kelo
reached the Supreme Court, still resided in the house in which she was born. Id. at 1. It was the only
place she had ever lived. Id. at 2. Wilhelmina’s son, Matt Dery, also lived in the neighborhood with his
wife and son. Id.
Bill Von Winkle and Richard Beyer did not live in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood, but they both
owned property in the area. Von Winkle owned a deli and some rental properties and Beyer was
renovating two homes in the area. See Complaint, supra, at 10–11, 13.
Byron Athenian had lived in the neighborhood for about eleven years when he received his
condemnation notice from the NLDC. He was only four years shy of paying off his mortgage.
Pasquale and Margherita Cristofaro had lived in the area for decades, moving in after they lost their
previous home to the city’s eminent domain power. Id. at 10. Finally, Jim and Laura Guretsky were a
young couple who owned a triplex property in the neighborhood. They lived in one of the homes with
their two daughters. Id. at 14.
8
As this Essay is a commentary on Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, it will also try to confine its
discussion to issues raised in that essay.
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evolved, but it could always be broken down into two simple ideas. First,
economic development could never be a public use because it was
primarily for the benefit of private business.9 Second, if economic
development could be a public use, there must be some reasonable
assurance that the taken property would in fact be used for a public use,
which, she claimed, was not present in this case.10 Unfortunately for Ms.
Kelo, she could not convince the courts.
When Attorneys Horton and Daniel Krisch11 prepared to defend the
City of New London and the NLDC before the Supreme Court, they
decided to emphasize how similar Kelo was to the Court’s previous
opinions on eminent domain and public use.12 They argued that the Court’s
precedent required that it defer to the legislative determination that
economic development was a public use—and that the power of eminent
domain could be used to accomplish such development—because the
takings were “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.”13
Additionally, the City and the NLDC asserted that there was no
“principled” reason to subject economic development to heightened
scrutiny.14 There was no “foundation in either logic or [the] Court’s
jurisprudence,” they contended, to subject economic development projects,
or more accurately, the use of eminent domain to accomplish such projects,
to greater scrutiny than in other takings cases.15
Ultimately, the Court agreed. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a
majority of the Court, concluded that developing local economies has long
been a function of state and local government and that it would be
9
See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 6, at 11–27 (arguing condemnation for sole purpose of
economic development not a public use); Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3–13, Kelo v. City of
New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004) (No. 16742), 2002 WL 34155033, at *3–13 (contending
taking for economic development is prohibited taking for private, not public, use).
10
See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 6, at 27 (asserting if economic development is a public use,
“there must at least be a reasonable certainty that the condemnations will result in [the purported]
public benefits” derived from the development plan); Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 9, at
15–19 (claiming takings could not be upheld because no assurance government would continue to
control development and assure public use).
11
Attorneys Wesley Horton and Daniel Krisch represented the City of New London and the
NLDC before the United States Supreme Court. Attorney Krisch wrote the brief. See Horton &
Levesque, supra note 1, at 1412.
12
Id.
13
Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 13–16 (citations omitted) (expounding the Court’s
deferential standard in Takings Clause cases). Attorneys Horton and Krisch further argued that under
the Court’s cases, the fact that the property would be transferred to another private party was
inconsequential. Id. at 24–28. The only question for the Court to determine, they contended, was
whether the City and the NLDC could have rationally concluded that the condemnations at issue would
produce some public benefit. Id. at 24. The means by which the City and the NLDC chose to
implement the plan were not to be of any concern to the Court. Id. at 25.
14
See id. at 39 (arguing if condemnation is for proper public purpose, the Court does not consider
whether condemnation will achieve its goals).
15
Id. at 40.
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“incongruous” to conclude that the benefits the City expected the Fort
Trumbull development project to produce were different from, or “less of a
public character” than, those public purposes the Court previously had
approved.16 He further insisted it would be a great departure from
precedent to adopt a heightened level of scrutiny that would allow courts to
consider whether there was a “reasonable certainty” that the purported
public benefit would occur in an economic development takings case.17
“When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are not
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of
takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of
socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal
courts.”18
I agree with the Court, and Attorneys Horton and Krisch, that declaring
what constitutes a public use is within the province of the legislature, with
only a limited role for the judiciary in reviewing such decisions.19 I further
agree that, under the deferential approach required by case law, economic
development is a proper public use. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the
contention that Takings Clause jurisprudence forecloses any and all
possibilities of heightened scrutiny by the judiciary in reviewing economic
development takings. It was possible, within the context of the case law at
the time of Kelo, for the courts to intervene and question whether a
particular taking was being implemented or administered for a public use,
and, further, whether the particular economic development project was
likely to materialize. I explain how in Part II of this Essay.
After explaining how the test I proposed in my Kelo dissent is
consistent with Takings Clause jurisprudence, I address, in Part III, the
mistaken claim of the Court and Attorneys Horton and Levesque that there
is no significant difference between economic development takings and
takings previously sanctioned by the Court. Part IV then answers the
somewhat naïve contention of Attorneys Horton and Levesque that
democracy is an adequate restraint on eminent domain abuse and the
principles of federalism dictate that public use determinations be left to the
states. Finally, Part V summarizes the major themes in this Essay and
stresses the importance of a greater role for the judiciary in the context of
economic development takings.
16
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484–85 (2005). The majority of the Court saw no
difference in taking private property for economic development and taking private property for
facilitating agriculture and mining, clearing blight, breaking up a land oligopoly, and reducing barriers
to entry in a particular market. Id.
17
See id. at 487–88 (noting petitioners’ alternative argument and rejecting as foreclosed by
precedent).
18
Id. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984)).
19
I must note, however, that I agree that the takings jurisprudence requires such deference. I am
not sure I would reach the same result if I were to answer the question as a matter of first impression.
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II. TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT FORECLOSE THE USE OF
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS CASES
I begin by explaining the approach I applied in Kelo and would have
applied in all subsequent economic development takings cases. Next, to
help readers better understand the origin of my test, I will briefly explain
the evolution of Connecticut takings and public use law. Then, I will
conduct a concise overview of the relevant United States Supreme Court
cases on the Public Use Clause. Finally, I will explain how the test outlined
in Part II.A is consistent with the case law summaries in Parts II.B and
II.C.
A. Clear and Convincing Likelihood of Development
Relying on early Connecticut cases, I proposed applying a four-part
test to the takings carried out by the City and the NLDC.20 It is a modified
version of the third step in that four-part test that the New London
homeowners asked the United States Supreme Court to adopt. It is also the
part of the test Attorneys Horton and Levesque characterize as “almost
impossible to satisfy.”21 That step, which I call the “likelihood-ofdevelopment test,” would have required the City and the NLDC to
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the economic
development plan would actually be implemented and therefore, the public
20
See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 587–92 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J.,
dissenting), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (setting out more exacting standard for review of economic
development takings). First, the court would determine whether the statutory scheme under which the
takings are effectuated is facially constitutional. Id. at 587. Second, if facially constitutional, the court
would consider whether the primary purpose of the particular economic development plan was for
private rather than public benefit. Id. at 588. Third, if the statutory scheme is facially constitutional and
the particular plan is primarily intended to benefit the public, the court would ask if “the specific
economic development contemplated by the plan will, in fact, result in a public benefit.” Id. Finally, if
the court finds for the taking party on the first three questions, the court will decide, under the
deferential standard of review, whether the specific condemnation is reasonably necessary to
implement the plan. Id. at 591.
The party challenging the taking will have the burden in steps one, two, and four. Id. at 587–88,
591. Thus, the challenger would need to prove that the statutory scheme was facially unconstitutional,
the particular economic development plan was motivated, primarily, by a desire to benefit a private
person or business, or that the challengers’ property is not reasonably necessary to accomplish the
economic development plan. Id. At each of these three stages, the court would employ the established
deferential standard of review. Id. At the third step, however, the burden of proof would shift to the
taking party. Id. at 588. Moreover, the taking party would have to prove that the plan will result in the
purported public benefit by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The burden would be satisfied by
establishing, through clear and convincing evidence, that the plan would actually be implemented. Id.
at 583, 588.
21
Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1411 n.39; see also Brief of Petitioners, supra note 6, at
36–48 (asking the Court to require taking authority prove “there is reasonable certainty that the
[economic development] project will proceed and yield the public benefits that are used to justify the
condemnation”).

1524

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1517

benefits projected to result from the plan and challenged takings would be
realized. Such a determination was necessary, I felt, because the court
could not determine whether the economic development project was a
“public use” without considering whether the proposed development would
in fact occur.
A majority of the justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected
my approach. Additionally, the City and the NLDC urged the United States
Supreme Court that this heightened standard of review was inconsistent
with its precedent. The Court agreed.22 My colleagues, the City and the
NLDC, and the United States Supreme Court justices, however,
misunderstood my point. They all concluded that legislatures determine,
with only a limited role for the courts, what is or is not a public use, and
the courts do not sit to second-guess the wisdom of such determinations.23
They further concluded that it is not the courts’ role to question whether
the project will in fact accomplish the City’s goals, such as increased tax
revenue and more jobs, or to evaluate the accuracy of the projected
economic outcomes of a project.24 Rather, it is left to legislative bodies to
determine the means by which they will carry out their objectives.
My primary concern, however, was much more basic than my
esteemed colleagues recognized. It was, quite simply, whether there was
clear and convincing evidence the hotel and convention center, office
space, and new housing contemplated by the plan would actually be built,
and therefore, whether the purported public benefits of increased tax
revenues and more jobs would be realized. If it was clear the construction
would indeed take place, then the court could conclude the use of eminent
domain by the City and NLDC was rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose,25 thereby satisfying the public use requirements of the
United States and Connecticut constitutions,26 provided, of course, that the
plan also passed the other parts of the test. On the other hand, if it appeared
22
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88 (concluding that a rule requiring New London to show with
reasonable certainty that a public benefit would accrue from a taking represented a great departure from
precedent).
23
See id. at 483 (“For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed
rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining
what public needs justify the use of the taking power.”); Kelo, 843 A.2d at 527–28 (holding
Connecticut public use jurisprudence was in harmony with federal cases and that the legislature was
afforded substantial deference); Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 39 (explaining the Supreme
Court “has been loath to scrutinize a legislative determination as to whether an economic decision
serves a public purpose”).
24
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 & n.20 (explaining courts will not entertain empirical debates
regarding the wisdom of takings).
25
See id. at 488 (declaring so long as the purpose is legitimate and the means are not irrational,
federal courts should leave matters of policy to the legislature (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984))).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. V; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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the construction was not likely to occur, or at least not within a reasonable
time, the court would be compelled to conclude that there was no rational
link between the City’s use of eminent domain and the public benefits that
would purportedly flow from the economic development project. Without
such a link, the takings would not be for a public use. With this
understanding, let us turn to the Public Use Clause jurisprudence.
B. Development of Connecticut Public Use Law
Connecticut law on public use developed in a way that not only
allowed for application of the likelihood-of-development test in Kelo, but
invited use of the test.27 Connecticut’s public use jurisprudence begins with
Olmstead v. Camp, in which the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a
narrow construction of “public use” in the Takings Clause of the
Constitution.28 Indeed, the court held public use “may . . . well mean public
usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit; so
that any appropriating of private property by the state under its right of
eminent domain for purposes of great advantage to the community, is a
taking for public use.”29 Additionally, Olmstead set the framework for
judicial deference to the legislature in determining what is or is not a
public use.30 The power of eminent domain must be elastic, the court
27

In referencing Connecticut law inviting the application of the likelihood-of-development test:
It is for the Legislature to say whether any given use is [a public use] or not . . . But
the question whether in any given instance the use is or will be administered as a
public or as a private use is a question which must of necessity be determined by the
courts in accordance with the facts of the particular case in hand.

Conn. Coll. for Women v. Calvert, 88 A. 633, 636 (Conn. 1913) (emphasis added); see also Evergreen
Cemetery Ass’n v. Beecher, 5 A. 353, 353–54 (Conn. 1886) (accepting use of land for burial places as
a public use in general, but noting such use is not public use when the cemetery is private and the
public does not have a right to bury there).
28
See Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 546 (1866) (declining to adopt defendant’s construction
of public use which would require that “property must be literally taken by the public as a body into its
direct possession and for its actual use”). In Olmstead, the owner of a water-powered mill wanted to
raise his dam, thereby flooding upstream property. Id. at 532–33. The mill was used to grind flour and
feed. Id. The court ultimately determined the taking of the upstream property was for a public use
because
[i]t would be difficult to conceive a greater public benefit than garnering up the
waste waters of innumerable streams and rivers and ponds and lakes, and
compelling them with a gigantic energy to turn machinery and drive mills, and
thereby build up cities and villages, and extend the business, the wealth, the
population and the prosperity of the state.
Id. at 551.
29
Id. at 546. The court concluded that such a construction was consistent with the meaning given
to public use by other courts, legislatures, and legal authorities. Id.
30
See id. (“If the public interest can in any way be promoted by the taking of private property it
must rest in the wisdom of the legislature to determine whether the benefit to the public will be of
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concluded, in order to meet the ever changing needs of society. Defining
the confines of the power must depend “on the presumed wisdom of the
sovereign authority, supervised, and in cases of gross error or extreme
wrong, controlled, by the dispassionate judgment of the courts.”32
Despite having adopted a broad definition of public use and
determining the court will defer to the legislature’s judgment of what
constitutes a public use, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not disclaim
all responsibility in policing the use of the eminent domain power. In
Olmstead, the court stated the power was subject to the courts’ control in
cases of gross error or extreme wrong, and in subsequent cases, the court
reserved for itself the right to determine whether the actual use to which
taken property was put was a public use.33 In Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n v.
Beecher, a cemetery owner sought to expand his burial grounds by
acquiring adjoining property through eminent domain, which was
permitted by the legislature.34 In that case, the court noted the proper burial
of the dead is necessary for the public health.35 The court further
recognized such burial requires land, and individuals might not always
want to sell their land for such a use.36 Therefore, “of necessity there must
remain to the public the right to acquire and use [land].”37 The court also
said that the use of the land remains a public use despite the requirement,
in many instances, that a fee be paid to obtain burial rights.38 If, however,
the cemetery is private and the public neither has nor can acquire burial
rights in it, then clearly the land is put to a private use and “the proprietor[]
of the[] [private cemetery] cannot take land for such continued private use
by right of eminent domain.”39
31

sufficient importance to render it expedient for them to exercise the right . . . .” (quoting Beekman v.
Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831))). Answering what limits the
legislative power under the Takings Clause, the court wrote:
The power requires a degree of elasticity to be capable of meeting new conditions
and improvements and the ever increasing necessities of society. The sole
dependence must be on the presumed wisdom of the sovereign authority, supervised
and in cases of gross error or extreme wrong, controlled, by the dispassionate
judgment of the courts.
Id. at 551.
31
Id. at 551.
32
Id.
33
See id.; see also infra notes 34–44 (reviewing cases in which the court considers the actual use
to which the property is put).
34
See Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n v. Beecher, 5 A. 353, 353 (Conn. 1886). The cemetery in
Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n was acting under a statute that delegated the power of eminent domain to
cemetery associations, allowing them to expand their burial grounds. See id. at 551.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 354.
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The court expounded on Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n in Connecticut
College for Women v. Calvert. The question in Connecticut College
regarded the constitutionality of a statute granting the college, a private
school, the right of eminent domain.40 In resolving this question, the court
accepted and approved of the legislature’s determination that the education
of women was a public use, noting “[i]t is for the legislature to say whether
any given use is governmental [i.e., public] in its nature or not.”41
Nevertheless, the court went on to consider, as it did in Evergreen
Cemetery Ass’n, whether the use would be administered as a public or
private use.42 Paraphrasing Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n, the court
acknowledged not all women’s colleges are open to the public and there
was no evidence suggesting the public held the right to gain admission to
Connecticut College.43 The court therefore sustained the trial court’s
determination that the grant of eminent domain to the college was
unconstitutional.44

40
See Conn. Coll. for Women v. Calvert, 88 A. 633, 634 (Conn. 1913). The Connecticut College
was a private educational corporation formed to educate women. Id. It was managed by a board of
trustees and the board was elected by members of the corporation. Id. The trustees set tuition fees,
made curriculum determinations, and established admissions criteria. Id.
41
Id. at 636.
42
See id. at 638 (describing how the use of state resources administered privately are of benefit to
the public to the extent the public uses or has a right to use them); see also id. at 636 (“It is for the
legislature to say whether any given use is governmental in its nature or not, subject to review by the
courts only in exceptional cases of extreme wrong . . . . But the question whether in any given instance
the use is or will be administered as a public or as a private use is a question which must of necessity be
determined by the courts in accordance with the facts of the particular case in hand.”).
43
See id. at 638 (“There is no allegation in the petition that the public has or can acquire the right
to enjoy the benefits of the land sought to be taken, no provision to that effect in the [college’s] charter,
and the stated corporate purposes of the [college] are not such as to impose upon it, as a necessary legal
consequence of its corporate character, the obligation of admitting to its courses of instruction all
qualified candidates, to the extent of its capacity, without religious, racial, or social distinction.”).
44
In reaching its conclusion, the court summarized:

[O]ur General Assembly has discretionary jurisdiction to declare any use public
which is greatly for the benefit of the community, and that this discretion is subject
to review by the courts only in case of extreme error.
Nevertheless, there must still remain for the courts, in all cases where the use
in question is capable of being administered either for a public or for purely private
end, the question whether the public has or can acquire the right to the use or benefit
of the property sought to be taken.
If the property is to be privately administered, and the public has not and
cannot acquire a right to its use or benefit, the power of eminent domain cannot,
upon principle and upon authority, be delegated in aid of a governmental use;
unless, as in the development of the natural resources of the State, a direct benefit to
the State results from the taking, which benefit continues to exist although the
property taken be subsequently used for a private use, and then only when such
benefit cannot otherwise be fully realized.
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Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n and Connecticut College recognize that an
important distinction exists in eminent domain cases: public versus private
ownership of the taken property. When the government takes and
continues to hold and use taken property there is little reason to question
whether the property was taken for a public use. A deferential approach to
reviewing such cases is therefore appropriate. When, however, property is
taken by a private party, or taken by the government but transferred to a
private party shortly thereafter, there is less reason to presume the property
will be put to a public use, and therefore, a less deferential review is
needed. Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n and Connecticut College recognized
this distinction and thus employed a higher level of judicial review. Those
cases require the courts to consider the actual use to which the property
will be put or whether the property will be administered in a way that is a
public use, or at least they did prior to Kelo. The courts must query, for
example, whether the taken property would be open to the public on equal
terms, to use for the burial of their beloved decedents, or whether the
property’s use would be limited to members of a particular private group,
such as a religion or congregation. That the legislature has declared the
burial of the dead a public use did not excuse the court from undertaking
such consideration. It is this distinction from which I drew the likelihoodof-development test in Kelo, where property was taken by a private
corporation (the NLDC) for transfer to a private developer. In the context
of economic development takings, I concluded the test required the taking
party to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the development
project would actually occur, i.e., the hotel, office buildings, and
residential space would be built, thus resulting in the increase in taxes and
jobs that constituted the public benefit.
C. United States Supreme Court Takings Clause/Public Use Jurisprudence
United States Supreme Court precedent regarding public use, unlike
Connecticut jurisprudence, has failed to recognize the important distinction
between public ownership and control and private ownership and control in
takings cases, and therefore, does not expressly invite the application of the
likelihood-of-development test. The Court’s failure to recognize this
distinction has resulted in a public use test that lags behind the evolution of
the eminent domain power, under which property is increasingly taken by
or for private parties. Surely, there is a difference between taking private
Id. at 640. Of course, in economic development takings cases, such as Kelo, the public benefit was not
access to a college education, but instead increased tax revenue and new jobs. Thus, when considering
whether the actual use to which the property is being put is a public use, the court needs to consider
whether the property will be used in a way to create the increased tax revenue and jobs. That is, the
court must query whether the proposed economic development plan will be implemented, thereby
creating the purported public benefit.
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property to construct a public road or build a public library and taking
private property to convey it to a private developer to build private homes
and private office buildings, with the hope such development will produce
the public benefits of jobs and increased taxes. Certainly, the latter should
receive more judicial scrutiny than the former; however, they receive the
same deference because the Court has never recognized the importance of
this distinction. It is interesting to note, however, as discussed in footnote
forty-seven below, the Court once acknowledged this difference.
Unfortunately, the distinction has been lost to time. Nevertheless, use of
the likelihood-of-development test is not foreclosed by the Court’s cases.
Moreover, as will be explained in Part III, economic development takings
are manifestly different than the takings previously upheld by the Court
and thus that distinction provides a principled basis for treating economic
development takings differently.
In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the Court
unequivocally rejected a narrow construction of “public use” that would
require the property be owned by the government or accessible to the
general public.45 Moreover, the Court signaled any definition of “public
use” would by necessity be broad and changing with the circumstances
when it noted: “It is obvious . . . that what is public use frequently and
largely depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the
particular subject-matter in regard to which the character of the use is
questioned.”46 Around the same time, the Court began deferring to
congressional determinations of what is or is not a public use;47 and by the
45
See, e.g., Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (“In discussing
what constitutes a public use, [Clark v. Nash] recognized the inadequacy of use by the general public as
a universal test.”); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 367–69 (1905) (noting what constitutes a public use
may change depending on the conditions of the area in which a taking occurs); Fallbrook Irrigation
Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 160 (1896) (declaring what constitutes public use often depends upon
facts and circumstances). Early on, the Court found that property taken and subsequently used by
private parties could, nonetheless, have been taken for a public use because of the benefit the public
would realize from such takings. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 161–62. For example, in
Fallbrook Irrigation and Clark, the Court upheld takings of private property to allow for the creation or
enhancement of irrigation systems so that adjoining landowners could turn their arid lands into
productive lands. See Clark, 198 U.S. at 370; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 161–62. Similarly,
in Strickley, the Court allowed a taking so a mining company could erect an aerial line across private
property to carry its product from the mines on the mountain sides to the railways in the valleys.
Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531. The Court was not troubled, in any of these cases, by the fact the property
would not be owned by the government or open to use by the public.
46
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 159–60.
47
See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896). In Gettysburg Electric
Railway, the Court considered whether the taking of land for the preservation and memorialization of
the Battle of Gettysburg was a taking for public use. See id. at 679–80. In reasoning that such
condemnations were for public use, the Court stated, “[W]hen the legislature has declared the use or
purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the use be palpably
without reasonable foundation.” Id. at 680. The Court continued to allow Congress to declare that a
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latter half of the twentieth century, the Court expressly dispelled any
notion that the same judicial deference would not be afforded to state
legislative determinations of public use as well.48 The broad meaning of
“public use” and judicial deference to legislative bodies reached their apex
in Berman v. Parker, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, and
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. It was these cases, Justice Stevens argued,
that compelled the result in Kelo.
In Berman, the Court considered a congressional act that allowed an
agency to condemn property in blighted or slum neighborhoods in the
District of Columbia in order for those areas to be redeveloped by
government agencies and private businesses or individuals.49 Samuel
Berman objected to the taking of his property, a non-blighted department
store, arguing the taking was for private, rather than public use.50 The
Court, however, upheld the taking as a public use, reasoning it is for the
legislature to determine what is in the public interest and there is no
exception simply because the power of eminent domain is being used.51
“The role of the judiciary,” the Court said, “in determining whether
[eminent domain] is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely
narrow one.”52 Congress has plenary power to govern the District of
Columbia, and therefore, according to the Court, it can utilize eminent
domain to accomplish that object.53 “Once the object [in Berman, the
governance and welfare of the nation’s capital] is within the authority of
taking’s purpose was a public use and implied that such declarations would be controlling until “shown
to involve an impossibility.” See Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925).
Interestingly, in Gettysburg Electric Railway, the Court distinguished between takings in which
the government itself exercises the power of eminent domain and those where the power is delegated to
a private corporation. See Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. at 680. The Court noted there was little reason
to fear eminent domain abuse when the government was taking land. Id. It went on to state, however,
“[i]t is quite a different view of the question which courts will take when this power is delegated to a
private corporation. In that case the presumption that the intended use for which the corporation
proposes to take the land is public, is not so strong as where the government intends to use the land
itself.” Id. It seems the Court has overlooked this distinction in its subsequent eminent domain cases.
48
See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (“[T]he fact that a state legislature,
and not the Congress, made the public use determination does not mean that judicial deference is less
appropriate.”). Although it was not until Midkiff that the Court expressly declared state legislative
bodies were entitled to deference, its earlier ruling made it clear the Court would follow such an
approach. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 160 (reasoning the people of California and
their elected representatives know the necessity of irrigation better than the Court and such knowledge
must be given due weight).
49
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–29 (1954).
50
Id. at 31.
51
See id. at 32 (“[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive.”).
52
Id. (citing Old Dominion Land Co., 269 U.S. at 66; United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946)).
53
See id. at 31, 33. The Court appears to conclude that the exercise of any congressional power is
a “public use” under the Takings Clause. Id. at 33.
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Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear.”54
The Court again employed judicial deference in Midkiff. Under
consideration in that case was the Land Reform Act, adopted by the
Hawaii legislature.55 The act was designed to redress failure in the real
estate market stemming from a land oligopoly and proposed doing so
through a condemnation scheme by which a lessor’s property could be
condemned and transferred to the lessee for just compensation.56
Landowners in Hawaii challenged the act, arguing the conveyance of land
from one private person to another was unconstitutional.57 The Court

54
Id. at 33. I am uncertain whether the Supreme Court reached the right result in Berman. If it
did, however, it certainly was not for the right reasons. The Court’s reasoning in Berman is, at best,
circular. In a case in which it was asked to determine whether Congress had transgressed the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause by allowing a redevelopment agency to take a non-blighted department
store it held:

Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served
by social legislation . . . . This principle admits of no exception merely because the
power of eminent domain is involved.
Id. at 32. Thus, in deciding whether Congress has exceeded the constitutional limits placed on its power
of eminent domain, the Court declared that Congress decides the public interest, and apparently
therefore the limits of eminent domain, subject to constitutional limits. The Court failed, however, to
announce what those limits are, the very task it was called upon to perform. As Justice Thomas noted in
his dissent in Kelo, this was a superb example of question begging. Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469, 519 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
That the Court completely failed to answer the question presented in Berman was not the only
flaw in its reasoning. The Court also seemed to reason that so long as the object Congress wishes to
achieve is within its powers, then eminent domain can be used as a means to accomplish that end.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means
to the end.”). This is a perplexing result, as Justice Thomas noted, because the purpose of the Fifth
Amendment, generally, and the Takings and Public Use clauses specifically, is to limit government
power. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Berman also appeared to reason that any
exercise by Congress of an enumerated power . . . was per se a ‘public use’ under the Fifth
Amendment. But the very point of the Public Use Clause is to limit that power.” (citations omitted)). If
Congress can use eminent domain to accomplish any object within its enumerated powers, what
independent meaning could the Takings Clause have? I should note, similar circular reasoning
appeared in the Court’s earlier takings cases as well. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
55
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232–33 (1984).
56
Id. When the Hawaiian Islands were originally settled, the Polynesian monarch established a
feudal land system in which control over land was assigned to certain high-ranking families. Id. at 232.
Around the time Midkiff reached the United States Supreme Court, land ownership in Hawaii remained
largely concentrated. See id. In fact, in the mid-1960’s it was discovered that forty-nine percent of the
state’s land was owned by the state and federal government and another forty-seven percent was owned
by only seventy-two private landowners. Id. Thus, the Hawaii legislature adopted the Land Reform Act
to dilute the land ownership market. Id. at 233.
57
See id. at 234–35.
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upheld the act. Primarily relying on Berman, the Court reasoned that
public use and a sovereign’s police powers are “coterminous” and that
courts have only a narrow role when reviewing legislative determinations
as to what is a public use.59 “In short, the Court has made clear that it will
not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what
constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable
foundation.’”60 The Court further noted that it had never struck down the
use of eminent domain when it was rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose.61
A month after Midkiff, the Court decided Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., also based largely on judicial deference to the legislature. Monsanto
challenged certain provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).62 The challenged provisions allowed the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use data submitted by
Monsanto as part of an application to register a pesticide when considering
subsequent applications to register similar pesticides manufactured by
Monsanto competitors.63 The data concerned the health, safety, and
environmental effects of the pesticide and were collected at considerable
costs.64 Monsanto argued that such use of the data was effectively a taking
58

58
Id. at 245. The Court reasoned it was within the state’s police power to regulate oligopolies,
and therefore, it would not disapprove of the use of eminent domain in exercising such regulatory
power. Id. at 242.
59
Id. at 239–41. Many cite Berman, as the Court did in Midkiff, for the beginning point of the
Court’s wrongful conflation of the police power and power of eminent domain. See, e.g., id. at 237;
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“More fundamentally, Berman and Midkiff erred by
equating the eminent domain power with the police power of States. . . . To construe the Public Use
Clause to overlap with the States’ police power conflates these two categories.” (citations omitted));
David L. Callies et al., The Moon Court, Land Use, and Property: A Survey of Hawaii Case Law 1993–
2010, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 635, 654 (2011) (noting Hawaii Land Reform Act was upheld by Supreme
Court due to “confusing conflation of police power and public use in Berman v. Parker”). The error of
the Court’s reasoning in this regard, however, can be traced back to the late 1800’s. In its early cases,
the Court used the Necessary and Proper Clause, as construed by McCulloch v. Maryland, to uphold
congressional use of eminent domain. See, e.g., United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S.
668, 681 (1896); Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529–30 (1894). Although the
nomenclature was different, the reasoning was similar. For example, in Gettysburg Electric Railway
Co., the Court said that Congress need not be expressly granted the right to exercise eminent domain to
condemn property for any particular public purpose. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at 681.
Instead, “it is implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate in exercising those
[enumerated] powers.” Id. This reasoning parallels the Court’s current jurisprudence: that so long as the
legislature’s object is within its police powers, eminent domain can be used to accomplish such object.
This leaves the Takings Clause with little, if any, independent meaning. See discussion supra note 54.
60
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (quoting Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at 680).
61
Id. (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700
(1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)).
62
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990 (1984).
63
See id. at 990, 993 n.4 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D) (1978)).
64
See id. at 998 (“Monsanto had incurred costs in excess of $23.6 million in developing the
health, safety, and environmental data submitted by it under FIFRA.”).
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of property for a private use. In deciding that FIFRA accomplished a
public use, the Court cited the now oft-repeated principle that “[t]he role of
the courts in second-guessing the legislature’s judgment of what
constitutes a public use is extremely narrow. . . . So long as the taking has
a conceivable public character, ‘the means by which it will be attained
is . . . for Congress to determine.’”66 The purpose of FIFRA was to lower
barriers to entry into the pesticide market by allowing applicants to use
data already collected by others, saving time and money by eliminating the
need to duplicate research.67 The Court determined that such a
“procompetitive purpose” was within Congress’ power and that any taking
for this purpose was a public use.68
Relying primarily on these three cases, the Court decided Kelo. After
reviewing Berman, Midkiff, and Ruckelshaus, the Court summarized those
holdings: “For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has
wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording
65

Id. at 999.
Id. at 1014–15 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33).
67
Id. at 1015.
68
Id. After the Court’s decisions in Midkiff and Ruckelshaus, the rule the Court had crafted was
clear. In essence, it provided that so long as the object the legislature seeks to obtain is within its police
powers—i.e., the elimination of blight, regulation of markets, economic development, etc.—it would be
a public use and eminent domain could be employed to accomplish such goal. Because the Court had
equated the power of eminent domain to the police powers, it established a framework in which the use
of eminent domain would be reviewed as all economic and social legislation is reviewed: through the
lens of rational basis scrutiny. That is, so long as the use of eminent domain is rationally related to
some conceivable public purpose, its use will be upheld by the courts, at least under the federal
constitution.
There is no doubt that it is wise for courts to defer to the wisdom of the legislature in regards to
economic and social policy. The courts are admittedly institutionally ill-equipped to pass on the
wisdom of such policies. The taking of a person’s private property, however, is not economic or social
legislation. Moreover, as Justice Breyer noted at the oral arguments in Kelo, rational basis is used when
reviewing economic and social legislation in the absence of a particular constitutional provision
designed to secure a particular individual freedom or limit governmental power. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 38, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108). That is not the case
when the use of eminent domain is in question. Indeed, there is a positive, constitutional protection, the
Fifth Amendment, targeted specifically at restraining the government’s power to take private property.
Thus, eminent domain cases are not suited for the same review as economic and social legislation, at
least not when the government will not itself use the taken property.
The reasoning that resulted in the conflation of the power of eminent domain with the
government’s general police powers has another flaw. Surely, the Fifth Amendment does not allow the
use of eminent domain to be justified only by the fact that it is employed to accomplish some goal, such
as economic development, that is within a state’s police powers. Such reasoning has never been
employed when interpreting other positive constitutional protections. For example, the Court does not
allow the legislature, city council, or police commissioner to determine what a reasonable search or
seizure is under the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that law enforcement is within the state’s
police powers. Interestingly, the Court’s cases have created a puzzling dichotomy. The Court will not
defer to a police officer when considering whether her search of a home was reasonable. When the
government wants to take that same home, however, the Court will not question the legislature’s
judgment.
65
66
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legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use
of the takings power.”69 Then, continuing on to consider the particular facts
of Kelo, the Court determined that the economic development plan
“unquestionably” served a public purpose because New London believed it
would “provide appreciable benefits to the community, including . . . new
jobs and increased tax revenue.”70 Citing its limited scope of review, the
Court concluded the challenged takings were for a public use because they
were a means to accomplishing the economic development plan, a plan the
city concluded would serve a public purpose.71 Rejecting Kelo’s argument
that, at the very least, economic development takings call for a more
searching review by the courts—such as utilization of the likelihood-ofdevelopment test—Justice Stevens argued that such a holding would
represent a great departure from precedent.72 “When the legislature’s
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear
that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings . . . are not to be carried
out in the federal courts.”73
D. Application of the Likelihood-of-Development Test Was Not Foreclosed
by Court Precedent
As illustrated by Parts II.B and II.C above, utilization of a higher
standard of scrutiny, such as the likelihood-of-development test, in cases
involving economic development takings is not prohibited by either
Connecticut or United States supreme courts precedent. In fact, both courts
expressly reserve some role for the judiciary in enforcing the public use
requirements of the federal and state constitutions.74 Indeed, the
Connecticut Supreme Court has said: “[w]hether the purpose for which a
statute authorizes the condemnation of property constitutes a public use is,
in the end, a judicial question to be resolved by the courts.”75 Similarly, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the judiciary has a narrow role
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005).
Id. at 483–84.
71
Id. at 484.
72
Id. at 487–88.
73
Id. at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984)).
74
See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984) (“The role of the courts in
second-guessing the legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use is extremely narrow.”); Old
Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) (“Congress has declared the purpose to be
a public use . . . Its decision is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.”);
Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908) (“The one and only principle in which all
courts seem to agree is that the nature of the uses, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial
question.” (emphasis added)); Gohld Realty Co. v. Hartford, 104 A.2d 365, 369 (Conn. 1954) (holding
what constitutes public use is ultimately a judicial question).
75
Gohld Realty Co., 104 A.2d at 369. The Gohld court went on to explain that although whether a
particular condemnation is for a public use is ultimately a question for the court, great weight must be
given to the legislature’s determination of public use. Id.
69
70
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in public use determinations. Although the Court held the judiciary’s task
was narrow in the realm of public use determinations, it did not completely
disclaim court responsibility in this area.77 Presumably, both courts carved
out a place for the judiciary because they could imagine instances where
the legislature might extend the power of eminent domain beyond its
rightful bounds, or cases in which the use of eminent domain was at its
outer-bounds, necessitating a closer look by the court. Taking private
property for economic development, in which the property is transferred to
a private developer and the public benefit to be realized, if any, depends
solely on the actions (or inactions) of such developer, is an example of a
taking at the outer-bounds of “public use” and the eminent domain power.
Moreover, as evidenced by the discussion in Part II.B above, the
Connecticut Supreme Court, despite its broad definition of public use and
deferential standard, has not historically viewed its role in takings cases as
limited to determining whether “the appropriate legislative authority
rationally has determined” that the proposed use will promote a public
benefit.78 Instead, it has acknowledged that the public use test needs to take
account of the evolution of the power and use of eminent domain by
recognizing the difference between government takings and use of
property and private takings and use of property. Therefore, when the
taking is done by a private party or the taken property will be put to use by
a private party, the court has reserved for itself the right to determine,
based upon the facts of a specific case, whether a particular taking is being
administered or implemented in a public way; that is, it considers the
actual use to which the property is put. Such an approach does not require
the court to second-guess legislative determinations of public use. In fact,
in Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n the court accepted the legislature’s
conclusion that operating a cemetery was a public use,79 and in
Connecticut College for Women it approved of the legislative declaration
that the higher education of women constitutes a public use.80 Moreover, in
neither case did the court question or second-guess the general method
chosen by the legislature to effectuate the declared public uses. The court
did not opine on the wisdom of using eminent domain by cemeteries to
assemble land for burial or by women’s colleges for building education
facilities. Instead, the court’s concern centered around how, in those
particular cases, the use was actually to be implemented or administered
76

76
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“The role of the judiciary in determining
whether [the eminent domain] power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow
one.”).
77
Id.
78
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 531 (2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
79
Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n v. Beecher, 5 A. 353, 353 (Conn. 1886).
80
Conn. Coll. for Women v. Calvert, 88 A. 633, 636 (Conn. 1913).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1536

[Vol. 48:1517

and whether it would, in fact, be public. Having concluded that there was
no evidence to suggest that the public had or could gain a right, on equal
terms, to access the cemetery in Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n or the college
in Connecticut College for Women, the court concluded that, despite the
proposed uses and the way in which they were to be carried out being
generally public in nature, they were, in fact, not public in those specific
instances.82 Thus, these cases not only allow for but invite the use of the
likelihood-of-development test in economic development takings to
determine whether the property taken will in fact be administered for a
public use. In the context of economic development takings, that will
largely entail considering whether there is clear and convincing evidence
that the proposed development will be built.
Although the United States Supreme Court’s public use jurisprudence
did not invite the use of the likelihood-of-development test in the same
manner as Connecticut law, it certainly did not prohibit its use.83 The fact
that the Court so concluded demonstrates that it completely missed the
point. In asking whether or not there is some level of certainty that an
economic development plan will actually materialize, courts would not
second-guess legislative declarations that economic development is a
public use and that eminent domain can therefore be used to accomplish
such development. Nor would the court be required to pass on the wisdom
of any particular development plan or the accuracy of the projected
economic benefits to be realized from such plan. Instead, the court would
consider whether there are any facts that indicate the actual plan—not the
plan’s purported public benefits—will materialize. The court would look
for clear and convincing evidence that the structures called for in the plan,
whether they be industrial parks, commercial office buildings, retail space,
or residential housing, will be constructed and sold, rented, or leased in a
reasonable amount of time. Attorneys Horton and Levesque contend that
this will be a hard test to meet.84 They are undoubtedly correct, but the test
is exacting for good reason: the government is taking the private homes
and businesses of citizens in order to replace them with facilities to be used
by other private parties. As I explained in my dissent in Kelo, this is not the
only area in which the government is required to meet a high burden of
81

See Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n, 5 A. at 353–54; Conn. Coll. for Women, 88 A. at 636, 638–39.
See Evergreen Cemetery Ass’n, 5 A. at 353–54 (stating that a strictly private cemetery
association could not take land for continued private use by right of eminent domain, even though it
was offering burial acreage for public use); Conn. Coll. for Women, 88 A. at 638 (reasoning that despite
the fact that giving women higher education is a use that is governmental in nature, there are many
colleges for the higher education of women at which the public cannot obtain the right to be educated,
and that land cannot be acquired through eminent domain for this continued private use).
83
See supra note 74.
84
See Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1411 n.39.
81
82
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proof before depriving a person of a constitutional right. Although the
test is exacting, it is not hard to imagine many instances where it could be
met by the taking authority. For example, the taking party could satisfy its
burden by presenting evidence of commencement and completion dates, a
construction schedule, committed financing, tenant commitments, or a
signed development agreement that includes conditions for project
completion. Surely, if under the circumstances there is no evidence that the
plan will actually be carried out, then the takings cannot be for a public
use.
I recognize that the United States Supreme Court previously has
acknowledged that a legislative plan involving the use of eminent domain
may not always accomplish its goals, and that such a possibility does not
change the analysis.86 “The proper inquiry before the Court is not whether
the provisions in fact will accomplish their stated objectives. [The Court’s]
review is limited to determining that the purpose is legitimate and that [the
legislature] rationally could have believed that the provisions would
promote that objective.”87 The likelihood-of-development test, however,
addresses a distinct question. Moreover, determining whether the
development is probable is an indispensable part of evaluating whether the
legislature could rationally believe the use of eminent domain would
promote the economic development.
First, whether the economic development plan adopted by the City of
New London will generate the number of jobs and tax dollars it projects is
not the primary concern of the likelihood-of-development test. Instead, the
test focuses on the much more fundamental point of whether the plan will
be implemented. At the time of the takings in Kelo there were a number of
factors that indicated the plan would not move forward, at least not at that
time. For example, “at the time of the takings, there was no signed
agreement to develop the properties, the economic climate was poor and
the development plan contained no conditions pertaining to future
development agreements that would ensure achievement of the intended
public benefit.”88 In fact, the development plan acknowledged that current
commercial rent levels did not support the construction of new office space
85

85
See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 588–90, 590 n.19 (2004) (Zarella, J.,
dissenting), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (listing cases requiring clear and convincing evidence). For
example, clear and convincing evidence is required to prove a claim of adverse possession, for a
nonparent to obtain visitation rights, to terminate parental rights, and to take a minor’s testimony
outside the presence of a criminal defendant. See id. at 589–90.
86
See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984) (stating that the Land Reform Act
of 1967 may not be successful in achieving its aims, but the efficacy of the statute’s relevant provisions
is not the question to decide; the constitutional requirement is satisfied if the state legislature rationally
could have believed that the Land Reform Act would promote is objective).
87
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015 n.18 (1984).
88
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 596 (Zarella, J., dissenting).
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and trial testimony showed that other office space in the area was vacant.89
Second, a court cannot determine whether the use of eminent domain
is a rational means to accomplish an economic development plan without
first determining whether the plan will be pursued or achieved. If, at the
time of a taking, the presumption is that development will not move
forward unless and until there is an increased demand for office space and
an uptick in economic conditions, then the taking of private property,
particularly a person’s home, to accomplish such development is irrational.
It is not the property that is needed to accomplish the economic
development. Instead, a change in the economic environment is necessary.
Taking the property will not produce such change. For example, if the
property in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood was simply to be taken and
cleared while the development project idled, awaiting an increased demand
for office space in New London or more favorable economic conditions,
then it seems that there could be no rational conclusion that the taken
property was being put to a public use. Thus, asking whether the proposed
use will in fact occur is part and parcel to deciding whether the city
“rationally could have believed that the [development plan] would promote
its objective.”90
III. THE VERY NATURE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
TAKINGS MAKES THEM DISTINCTIVE
Contrary to the contentions of Attorneys Horton and Levesque and the
conclusion of the Court in Kelo, the facts in Kelo were not so similar to
previous Supreme Court cases that there was no “principled way of
distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that
[the Court had] recognized.”91 I can think of at least three principled ways
to distinguish the Kelo takings.
First, in the types of takings previously approved by the Court, the
“public use” occurs either simultaneously with the taking or shortly
89
See Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *66 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
13, 2002) (noting how historical values of Class A office buildings had not recovered sufficiently to
justify new construction except for use by end users, and referencing a 2001 report stating that new
office building construction is generally not feasible), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.
2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
90
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 (emphasis omitted). In Midkiff, the Court was not concerned with
whether the Land Reform Act would achieve its objective of correcting the market failure caused by
the land oligopoly. Instead, the proper question was whether Hawaii’s legislature could have
reasonably believed that the act would achieve such a goal. See also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1015
n.18 (noting whether congressional act will reduce barrier to entry in pesticide industry is
unimportant—what was important was whether Congress could rationally have so concluded).
91
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). The Court posited that it would be
“incongruous” to suggest a difference exists between taking for economic development and taking to
facilitate agriculture and mining, the transformation of a blighted neighborhood, breaking up a land
oligopoly, and the elimination of a barrier to entry. Id. at 484–85.
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thereafter by the volition of the government and not an independent private
actor or some other uncontrollable outside factor, such as the economy.
The public use in Berman, and other redevelopment cases, is accomplished
when the blight and the conditions that caused it are removed.92 It is true
that the government does not always remove the blight itself.93
Nevertheless, by leasing or selling the taken property to accomplish the
removal of the blight and the conditions that cause blight, the government
ensures that the public use is attained. What a private individual or
business does with the property after the blight is removed, although
important, is of little concern in the public use determination because the
public use has already been accomplished. Contrarily, when property is
taken in connection with an economic development plan, what a private
developer does with such property after any existing structures are
removed is central to the question of whether the property will in fact be
put to a public use. If the property is to be immediately developed into a
large office complex that will attract new business, thereby creating new
jobs and increasing tax revenue, it most certainly will be put to a public
use. If, on the other hand, the property is to remain barren and unused until
the developer receives commitments from enough end users to justify
building the complex, it cannot be said when, if ever, the property taken for
a concededly public use—economic development—will be put to such use.
In similar fashion, the public use occurred at the time of the takings in
Midkiff, Ruckelshaus, and National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
Maine Corp., not sometime thereafter. The purported public use in
Midkiff—breaking up the land oligopoly—occurred when the state housing
authority took the lessor’s land and transferred it to the lessee, diluting the
concentration of the state’s land controlled by the lessor.94 Likewise, the
EPA’s taking and use of Monsanto’s health, safety, and environmental data
when reviewing a subsequent application for registration of a pesticide
accomplished the public use of eliminating a barrier to entry of the
pesticide industry—the costly and time consuming research required for
registration.95 Finally, the public use of facilitating Amtrak rail service was
attained when the Interstate Commerce Commission condemned railroad
track that Boston & Maine had allowed to fall into disrepair and transferred
92
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954) (observing Congress’ finding that assembly of
real property for purposes of redevelopment, i.e., removal of blight and slum conditions, is a public
use); see also, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Mich. 2004) (noting in
redevelopment cases “the act of condemnation itself, rather than the use to which the condemned land
eventually would be put, was a public use”).
93
See Berman, 348 U.S. at 30 (explaining redevelopment agency transfers property to other
public agencies or “redevelopment companies, individuals, or partnerships” for redevelopment
(emphasis added)).
94
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233–34, 242.
95
See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014–15.
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it to another rail company under the condition that it restore the tracks to an
acceptable condition.96
The second way to distinguish the takings in Kelo is that the takings
previously condoned by the Court have natural limitations. For example, in
order to take property under a redevelopment plan, such as in Berman, the
property has to be located in an area that is either “slums” or “blighted,”97
and in Midkiff, takings were to be limited to the estates of the large
landowners.98 The takings approved in Kelo, however, have no natural
limitation.99 Instead, any property can be taken if a legislative body
rationally concludes it could be used to promote the economic
development of the community. Under the principles of Kelo, no piece of
property, blighted or pristine, home or business, is outside the sovereign’s
power of eminent domain.
Third, as noted in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo, the pre96
See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 412, 422–23 (1992).
Boston & Maine Corporation owned a portion of railroad track that Amtrak used to provide rail service
between Montreal and Washington, D.C. Id. at 411. Amtrak had the right to use the track under an
agreement between it and Boston & Maine, which required Boston & Maine to maintain the tracks. Id.
Over time, however, Boston & Maine entered bankruptcy and was purchased by Guilford
Transportation Industries, Inc.; Amtrak claimed this purchase led to track maintenance neglect, delays
in rail service, and the eventual suspension of the Montrealer service. Id. at 412. Amtrak attempted to
negotiate better maintenance, but when those negotiations were unsuccessful, it requested that the
Interstate Commerce Commission condemn the tracks. Id. at 412–13. Amtrak would then transfer the
railway to a third-party railroad, under an agreement that would require the third-party railroad to
restore and maintain the tracks to Amtrak’s standards. Id. at 412.
It must be noted that in addition to the public use occurring in National R.R. Passenger Corp. at
the time of the taking as discussed above, the taking also involved a fundamental and long-time public
use, the facilitation of rail service. See, e.g., 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 85 (2014) (“[L]and can
be condemned for intercity-rail-passenger service where it can be shown that the taking is necessary for
that purpose.”).
97
See, e.g., Berman, 348 U.S. at 28–29 (outlining a provision of the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act providing for elimination of slum, blighted, and substandard housing conditions);
Aposporos v. Urban Redevelopment Comm’n, 790 A.2d 1167, 1177 (Conn. 2002) (“[U]nder the
redevelopment act, it is only with reference to a redevelopment area, i.e., a blighted area, ‘that a local
redevelopment agency is authorized to . . . take private property by condemnation.’” (citing Gohld
Realty Co. v. Hartford, 104 A.2d 365, 369 (Conn. 1954))).
98
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. The Land Reform Act provides that tenants living in lots situated on
large development tracts of land can petition to have the land condemned. Id. The state housing
authority will then consider whether transferring the property to the tenants would serve the purpose of
breaking up the oligopoly. Id. at 233–34.
99
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 504–05 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“Today nearly all real property is susceptible to condemnation on the Court’s theory. . . . ‘[N]ow that
we have authorized local legislative bodies to decide that a different commercial or industrial use of
property will produce greater public benefits than its present use, no homeowner’s, merchant’s or
manufacturer’s property, however productive or valuable to its owner, is immune from condemnation
for the benefit of other private interests that will put it to a ‘higher’ use.’” (quoting Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464 (Mich. 1981))); Sw. Ill. Dev. Authority
v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2002) (noting that all lawful business incidentally
contributes to regional economic growth).
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condemnation use of the property taken in Berman and Midkiff was
harmful to the public.100 The redevelopment area in Berman had
deteriorated and become a health and safety risk to the public.101 Of course,
Berman’s department store was not itself blighted and therefore the use of
his specific piece of property was not a public harm. Such narrow thinking,
however, misses the forest for the trees. The danger to the public health
and safety was caused by the area, not any one individual piece of
property, and Congress concluded the way to remediate that harm was to
redevelop the entire area and remove the conditions which caused the
blight, thereby necessitating, in its mind, the taking of Berman’s store. In
Midkiff, the concentrated ownership of land had caused the residential fee
simple market to fail, and in National Railroad Passenger Corp., the
neglected tracks produced a public harm by causing the suspension of
Amtrak service between Washington, D.C., and Montreal. In Kelo, on the
other hand, the property owners’ use of the land was not harmful.102
Susette Kelo and the others did not cause the depressed economic
conditions in New London by using their property for homes. Neither were
their homes deteriorating nor the neighborhood blighted.103 In fact, many
of the property owners who wished to stay in the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood had expended considerable time and money maintaining
their homes.104
I therefore contend that the City and the NLDC were wrong in arguing,
and the Court was mistaken in concluding, that there was no difference
between the economic development takings at issue in Kelo and those
takings previously addressed by the Court. There are in fact significant
distinctions and it is those differences that require the courts to take on a
more meaningful role in protecting private property rights in the context of
economic development takings.
IV. DEMOCRACY PLACES NO MEANINGFUL LIMIT ON EMINENT
DOMAIN AND ENFORCING THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE DOES NOT
OFFEND THE PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM
Attorneys Horton and Levesque argue in their essay,105 as was argued
before the Court,106 that the democratic process, not some court-created
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See Berman, 348 U.S. at 28–29, 30–31 (outlining congressional act allowing condemnation of
blighted areas and describing particular area at issue in Berman).
102
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 475 (majority opinion).
104
Id.
105
See Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1425 (averring democratic process should make
public welfare decisions and electorate will serve as check for unpopular condemnations).
106
See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 21 (contending Court institutionally ill-suited to
determine public use because removed from democratic process).
100
101
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and administered standard, is the proper limit on public use determinations
and adequately protects property owners from eminent domain abuse. Such
a contention, however, plainly ignores reality. When the legislature is left
to determine public use, the risk that the majority will abuse the political
process to capture the power of eminent domain and use it against the
interests of less powerful minorities intensifies.107 The Framers must have
had such abuse in mind when they drafted the Takings Clause. Likewise,
democracy also can be an insufficient protection for the majority when
legislatures or local governments are captured by powerful interest groups
that persuade the members of those bodies to use eminent domain to
accomplish their goals.108
History in fact has shown majoritarian oppression in the use of eminent
domain, in that takings have disproportionately affected minority, elderly,
and poor neighborhoods. Between 1949 and 1973, under the guise of urban
renewal, 2,532 redevelopment projects were undertaken in 992 cities
across the country.109 As a result of those projects, one million individuals
were displaced.110 Two-thirds of the displaced individuals were AfricanAmericans, at a time when African-Americans made up only twelve
percent of the United States population.111 This trend continues today. In a
survey of 184 development projects in which eminent domain was used or
threatened between 2003 and 2007, it was discovered that a greater
percentage of the residents in the project areas, vis-à-vis the surrounding
communities, were minorities, less educated, and economically

107
See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for
Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 547 (2006) (observing
many African-American and poor neighborhoods were destroyed under the auspices of urban renewal).
108
Id. at 547–48 (positing outrage after Kelo was driven by appearance of powerful minority
“tak[ing] control of the machinery of eminent domain” to enrich itself at the expense of a powerless
minority). Cohen notes that this can particularly be a problem when the taking targets a small number
of condemnees. Id. at 547. Further, the specter of a powerful minority taking the property of a
powerless minority is likely to always be true in the context of takings for economic development,
where the objective is to increase tax revenue or create jobs by putting the taken property to more
productive use. Id. at 548; see also, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The
beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political
process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now
has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more.”).
109
MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, INST. FOR JUSTICE, 1 EMINENT DOMAIN & AFRICAN
AMERICANS: WHAT IS THE PRICE OF THE COMMONS? 2 (2007), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
03/Perspectives-Fullilove.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5YJ-JY84].
110
Id.
111
Id. Another commentator has noted that between 1949 and 1963, seventy-eight percent of the
120,000 families displaced by urban renewal were nonwhite. Josh Blackman, Equal Protection from
Eminent Domain: Protecting the Home of Olech’s Class of One, 55 LOY. L. REV. 697, 703 (2009).
Justice Thomas gave a slightly different statistic for the same period, stating approximately 177,000
families were displaced by urban renewal and of those families whose race was known, sixty-three
percent were nonwhite families. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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disadvantaged.
This impact pervaded takings cases before the courts as well. For
example, in Berman, the Court acknowledged that African-Americans
made up 97.5 percent of the 5,012 residents that would be displaced by the
Southwest Washington, D.C., redevelopment project it upheld in that
case.113 Similarly, in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, a
neighborhood comprised largely of first- and second-generation PolishAmericans was cleared to make way for a new General Motors factory.114
In order to clear an area for the GM plant, 1,176 structures had to be
destroyed and 3,438 people were displaced.115 Moreover, one amicus
curiae brief informed the Court of a number of development projects,
ongoing at the time of Kelo, that disproportionately affected minorities.116
Such examples included a project in San Jose, California, in which ninetyfive percent of the targeted properties were Hispanic or Asian owned and
an economic development area in Ventnor, New Jersey, that encompassed
forty-percent of the city’s Latino population.117
Additionally, it is not difficult to imagine that in a city plagued by
years of economic decline, an unemployment rate twice that of the state,
and a lower-than-average median income, those who oppose an economic
development plan requiring the condemnation of their homes will find little
support from their fellow city residences who are hoping for an economic
resurgence. Justice Ryan suggested as much in his Poletown dissent when
he said:
112

As the new plant site plans were developed and
announced . . . and the demolitionist’s iron ball razed
neighboring commercial properties such as the already
abandoned Chrysler Dodge Main plant, a crescendo of
112
See Dick M. Carpenter & John K. Ross, Testing O’Connor and Thomas: Does the Use of
Eminent Domain Target Poor and Minority Communities?, 46 URB. STUD. 2447, 2453, 2455 (2009).
The project areas residents were 58% minority, compared to 45% in the surrounding communities. Id.
at 2455. Moreover, a greater percentage of project areas residents held less than a high school diploma,
relative to the surrounding community—34% and 24%, respectively—and only 9% of project areas
residents, compared to 13% of residents in the surrounding communities, had bachelor’s degrees. Id.
The median income of residents residing in the project areas ($18,935.71) was also lower than the
median income of the surrounding communities ($23,113.46), and a greater percent of project areas
residents lived below the poverty line, 25% compared to 16% in the surrounding communities. Id. The
survey of these projects further concluded that the difference in the above categories is statistically
significant. Id.
113
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954).
114
304 N.W.2d 455, 470 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting), overruled by County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
115
Id. at 464 n.15 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
116
See Brief of NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9–11, Kelo, 545 U.S.
469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057, at *9–11.
117
See id. at *10.
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supportive applause sustained the city and General Motors
and their purpose. Labor leaders, bankers, and
businessmen . . . were joined by radio, television, newspaper
and political opinion-makers in extolling the virtues of the
bold and innovative fashion in which, almost overnight, a
new and modern plant would rise from a little known innercity neighborhood of minimal tax base significance. The
promise of new tax revenues, retention of a mighty GM
manufacturing facility in the heart of Detroit, new
opportunities for satellite businesses, retention of 6,000 or
more jobs, and concomitant reduction of unemployment, all
fostered a community-wide chorus of support for the project.
It was in such an atmosphere that the plaintiffs sued to enjoin
the condemnation of their homes.118
Later in his dissent, Justice Ryan noted, “[v]irtually the only discordant
sounds of dissent have come from the minuscule minority of citizens most
profoundly affected by this case, the Poletown residents whose
neighborhood has been destroyed.”119 Justice Ryan’s inclination was
supported by a study done by three political scientists who concluded a
majority of Detroit voters likely supported the project.120
In addition to the difficulty the condemnees may have in garnering
public sympathy for the loss of their homes in the face of a plan that
promises an economic renaissance, it is unlikely the democratic process
will hold municipal leaders accountable.121 There are many reasons why
local politicians are likely to go unpunished for poor economic
development plans and abuse of the power of eminent domain. First, the
cost-benefit analysis in economic development projects is complex and
many voters may be unable, on their own, to determine whether or not a
project is cost-effective.122 Second, the benefits of these projects—
increased tax revenues and jobs or a healthier overall local economy—take
years to materialize, if they ever do, and project failure may only be
apparent long after the takings when public sentiment has moved on to
118
Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 N.W.2d at 470–71 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting). The
prospect of the new General Motors factory was undoubtedly popular in the Detroit metropolitan area.
Along with the factory came the promise of jobs—6,150 according to GM executives—at a time when
the unemployment rate was approximately fourteen percent in Michigan and eighteen percent in
Detroit. Id. at 465, 467.
119
Id. at 482.
120
See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic
Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1023.
121
See id. at 1022; see also Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary:
Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 82–83 (1998) (positing
landowners’ ability to influence election outcome “is vanishingly small”).
122
See Somin, supra note 120, at 1022.
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different policy issues. Third, the costs of many economic development
takings are widely dispersed among the taxpayers, creating little incentive
for individual taxpayers to oppose specific condemnations.124
It is not only the powerless minorities, however, who should be
concerned. The majority’s confidence in the democratic or political process
to appropriately limit public use and eminent domain also is misplaced
because of the possibility that local governments will be captured by
powerful interest groups.125 There are a number of reasons why interest
groups can easily capture local governments when eminent domain is used
to promote economic development. One is that the expansive justification
that economic development provides for the use of eminent domain
increases the number of groups that can persuade the government to use
the power.126 Moreover, it creates a vast number of potential projects that
can utilize eminent domain as a tool for implementation.127 Two, the
concentrated benefit that results from economic development takings
creates an incentive to capture the eminent domain process.128 For
example, the primary beneficiary of the assembly and development of a
large tract of land would be the developer, who would construct and then
sell or lease office, retail, and residential space.129 Because developers
stand to gain from the development of the taken property, they have the
incentive to persuade local authorities to use eminent domain to implement
the project.130 Three, special interests, such as corporations, developers,
123

123
See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 113–14 n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing in
a different context “the time lag between when the deprivations are imposed and when their effects are
felt may diminish the efficacy of this political safeguard”); Somin, supra note 120, at 1022. Professor
Somin notes that in Poletown the General Motors factory was not completed until four years after the
takings, which occurred in 1981, and that it was not until the late 1980s that it became clear that the
factory would not generate the number of promised jobs. Id. at 1022–23.
124
Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based
on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2006) (outlining four
reasons why political process is an ineffective check against use of eminent domain for economic
development).
125
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 107, at 547–48; Kelly, supra note 124, at 34–41 (postulating
eminent domain for economic development creates incentives for private influence in process due to
concentrated benefit, low cost to private party, and disparity in legal and financial resources); Somin,
supra note 120, at 1021–23 (identifying three reasons local governments are especially subject to
capture in economic development takings).
126
See Somin, supra note 120, at 1021–22.
127
See id. Professor Somin notes that the greater number of groups that can utilize eminent
domain under an economic development justification, combined with the greater number of projects
that can, under such a justification, legitimately utilize the condemnation power, makes eminent
domain an attractive means for these groups to accomplish their private development objectives. Id.
128
Kelly, supra note 124, at 34–35.
129
See id. at 34.
130
See id. at 34–35. The benefit derived from the use of eminent domain for public uses such as
roads, parks, and hospitals is juxtaposed with the benefit derived from economic development takings.
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and the like, that support economic development projects requiring the use
of eminent domain may have more political influence than condemnees
because they are repeat players in the political realm.131 Moreover, because
these politically powerful groups are repeat players, they are already
organized and have considerable financial resources.132 Four, local
governments, particularly those in desperate need of economic resurgence,
are especially susceptible to being enticed by the promise of more jobs and
increased tax revenue.133 Undoubtedly, these are only a few of the reasons
politically powerful groups are in a position to co-opt the eminent domain
process for use in economic development projects.
Even when the democratic or political process does act as a restraint on
the use of eminent domain, it is likely the politically influential targets of a
taking that will be afforded its protection. New London provides a prime
example. When the municipal development plan at issue in Kelo was
originally approved, all property and buildings within the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood were to be condemned and razed. Nevertheless, the Italian
Dramatic Club, a men’s social club, was able to obtain a modification in
the plan, allowing its clubhouse to remain.134 Unfortunately, Byron
Athenian, whose home was located immediately adjacent to the Italian
Dramatic Club, was unable to secure the same treatment.
Democracy’s inability to adequately restrain eminent domain abuse,
combined with a definition of public use that essentially leaves property
ownership rights subject to the will of the majority or powerful special
Id. at 34. In the former, the beneficiaries are numerous and dispersed; thus, the incentive to abuse the
eminent domain process is much less significant. Id.
131
Kochan, supra note 121, at 82.
132
See id. at 80–82 (illustrating how information and transaction costs associated with opposing
legislation benefiting special interests make it cost-prohibitive to fight condemnation decisions); Kelly,
supra note 124, at 39–41 (noting disparate legal and financial resources between developers and
homeowners makes it easier for developers to co-opt eminent domain power).
133
Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of Representation
Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 4, 18 (2005) (“[M]any local governments, especially the cashpoor central cities, are trying ever harder to raise revenue by attracting businesses and wealthy
residents . . . thus making an eminent domain an irresistible tool.”); Adam P. Hellegers, Eminent
Domain as an Economic Development Tool: A Proposal to Reform HUD Displacement Policy, 2001 L.
REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 901, 905 (arguing local governments are more susceptible to corporate influence
in economic development decisions, in part, because of competition between localities for jobs).
Professor Boudreaux observed that eminent domain abuse is driven, in part, by the growing
competition among governments to attract businesses to their communities. Boudreaux, supra, at 18.
Due to the excessive demand for a limited number of “attractive and job-creating companies,” cities
have resorted to the use of eminent domain to “lower the cost of doing business in their communities.”
Id. at 18–19.
134
See JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND COURAGE 65–66
(2009). The Italian Dramatic Club was built by Italian immigrants after World War I and originally
served as an Italian cultural center. Id. By the late 1990s, however, it had become a political power in
New London. Id. at 66. In fact, when the Italian Dramatic Club was negotiating for its exemption for
the development plan a state court judge negotiated on the club’s behalf. Id. at 151–53, 163–64.
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interests are precisely the reasons courts must have a meaningful role in
reviewing public use determinations and condemnations. Reserving a role
for the judiciary is not offensive to the separation of powers, nor is it an
assault on federalism to allow federal courts to protect property owners
when state legislatures and courts fail to do so, as suggested by Attorneys
Horton and Levesque.135 Indeed, it is fundamental in our constitutional
system that the role of the judiciary is to restrain the majority when it
exceeds the bounds of its authority or transcends the limits of the Bill of
Rights.136 Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified specifically

135
See Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1418–19 (arguing federalism should be allowed to
work by leaving development of eminent domain and public use jurisprudence to state courts); see also
Brief of the Respondents, supra note 2, at 21–22 (asserting deferring to state legislatures and
municipalities on economic decisions maintains proper balance between state and federal government).
136
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

[T]he courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the
legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned
to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province
of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should
happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, . . . the Constitution ought
to be preferred to the statute . . . .
. . . [W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to
that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by
the latter rather than the former.
....
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community . . . . [I]t is not to be inferred from [the principle that
the Constitution may be amended], that the representatives of the people, whenever
a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents,
incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution, would, on that
account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions . . . .
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the
independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the
injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial
laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in
mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to
moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it
operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them . . . .
Id.
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to limit the power of state governments. It is a complete disregard of
these principles to argue that the legislature, limited only by the will of the
majority, can declare what is a public use, and therefore, when eminent
domain may be employed, unrestrained by the courts, other than to
determine whether such decisions are rational and made in good faith.
Of course, it is argued that in other areas of economic and social
legislation, despite the judiciary’s duty to protect the minority from the will
of the majority, courts employ a similar deferential approach. That is, when
economic or social legislation is challenged it is reviewed under a rational
basis standard: the challenged law, to withstand judicial scrutiny, must
only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose.
Conflating legislation that authorizes the taking of private property with
general social and economic legislation, however, overlooks a glaring
difference. The former involves the taking of private property, a power
limited by the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, and general economic
and social legislation do not.
137

V. CONCLUSION
In summary, the utilization of the likelihood-of-development test in
Kelo would have been consistent with Connecticut precedent that
recognized the need for increased judicial scrutiny when property is taken,
owned, and put to use by private, rather than public, parties. Further,
utilization of the test would not have been inconsistent with United States
Supreme Court precedent. The likelihood-of-development test
differentiates between the purported use and actual use to which the taken
property will be put, and simply questions whether the actual use will in
fact be the purported public use. It does not question the legislative
judgment that economic development (the purported use in Kelo) is an
appropriate public use. Moreover, the test does not second guess the City’s
and the NLDC’s projected increases in jobs and tax revenue. Instead, the
test merely questions whether there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding that the development plan would actually be implemented,
meaning that the hotel and convention center, office space, and residential
neighborhood would in fact be built.
Not only would the likelihood-of-development test have been
consistent with court precedent, but economic development takings are
distinct from takings previously upheld by the Connecticut and United
137
See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453–55 (1976) (observing congressional action
under Fourteenth Amendment can abrogate state sovereign immunity because that amendment’s
ratification limited state power and caused a shift in federal-state balance); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
(10 Otto) 339, 346 (1879) (holding Congress could prohibit exclusion of people of color from state
juries under Fourteenth Amendment, noting: “The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are
directed to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power.”).
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States supreme courts. Therefore, there were justifiable and principled
reasons for holding the taking authority to a more exacting standard of
judicial scrutiny. Economic development takings should be more closely
reviewed by the courts because the takings alone do not accomplish a
public purpose, there is no natural limitation to such takings, and it is not
necessary that the previous use of the taken property be harmful to the
public.
Finally, it is unlikely that the democratic process is a meaningful
limitation of the eminent domain power. History has demonstrated that
eminent domain has disproportionately impacted minority, elderly, and
poor neighborhoods. Moreover, local governments are susceptible to
capture by powerful interest groups who co-opt the eminent domain
process for their own private gain. Finally, relying on the democratic
process to restrain the use of eminent domain only ensures that the
politically powerful can save their property from condemnation.
Meanwhile, those without political clout will be left searching for a new
place to reside or conduct their business.
There is no better argument for an increased role of the judiciary in the
context of economic development takings than Kelo itself. First, the taken
properties in Kelo were not blighted or rundown. In fact, the plaintiffs had
invested substantial time and money in maintaining their properties.
Second, the politically powerful Italian Dramatic Club was spared from
condemnation while the homes and businesses of Susette Kelo and her
neighbors remained slated for destruction. Third, despite mounting public
resistance to the Fort Trumbull redevelopment plan, the City and the
NLDC pressed forward.
Finally, and most troublingly, ten years after the United States
Supreme Court upheld the condemnation of the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood, the property remains barren. As I predicted, the
development plan never moved forward.138 Today, New London remains a
138
Attorneys Horton and Levesque would have you believe that the Fort Trumbull development
plan failed because of the litigation. Horton & Levesque, supra note 1, at 1410. Such a suggestion is
disingenuous at best. The litigation did not prevent commencement of all development. Both parcels 1
and 2, where the hotel and conference center and upscale housing were planned, were ready to be
developed when the litigation first began. Moreover, Pfizer had agreed, prior to the decision in the trial
court, to subsidize a large number of the hotel rooms. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002
WL 500238, at *41 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.
2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Thus, the litigation presented no roadblock to building the hotel and
conference center or the housing. On the other hand, construction of the office space on Parcel 3 was
not planned to begin until warranted by market conditions. Id. at *67. At the time of trial, however,
market demand for Class A office space in New London was soft and it was not feasible to begin new
construction. Id. at *66–67. Additionally, the developer testified that new construction would not begin
without tenants and at that time there were no tenant commitments. See id. at *67. Considering these
facts together, it seems much more likely that the development plan failed because it was not
economically feasible to move forward and the proposed developer was not legally required to do so.
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See Publications: Distressed Municipalities, CT.GOV, http://www.ct.gov/ecd/cwp/view.asp?a=
1105&q=251248 [https://perma.cc/T82F-DGXM] (follow 2015 “Distressed Municipalities” hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (identifying New London as a distressed municipality). See generally Quick
Facts: Connecticut, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/09,09
52280 [https://perma.cc/TBM8-NSR4] (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). According to the United States
Census Bureau, the 2010–2014 median household income for New London was $41,230. Id. Over the
same period, the median household income in Connecticut was significantly higher, $69,899. Id. The
percentage of individuals living below the federal poverty level was also higher in New London
relative to Connecticut, 25.3% and 10.8%, respectively. Id.

